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Abstract— This research aims to develop a method-
ology to evaluate the security of Manta Port progres-
sively achieving secondary objectives that culminate in 
the creation of a risk matrix. A simple quantitative and 
qualitative methodology is used; it determines the com-
bination of risk with the damage that could be caused, 
along with the estimated probability of an incident, 
thus, leading to a risk assessment. As a final result, a 
risk matrix for the Port of Manta was developed, which 
is the final chapter in the development of the suggested 
methodology; besides, it presents a clear and true pic-
ture of risk assessment so as to determine security lev-
els and develop a method feasible to be implemented in 
any port of the world.
Keywords— Ports, Security, Risks, Protection Measure, 
Vulnerability, ISPS, SOLAS
Resumen—Este trabajo de investigación tiene como obje-
tivo desarrollar una metodología de evaluación de la segu-
ridad portuaria de Manta, alcanzando progresivamente 
objetivos secundarios que culminan con la creación de una 
matriz de riesgos. Se emplea una metodología sencilla, tan-
to cuantitativa como cualitativa, que determina la combi-
nación del riesgo con el daño que se podría causar, junto con 
la probabilidad estimada de que ocurra un incidente, dando 
así lugar a una valoración del riesgo. Como resultado final 
se elaboró una matriz de riesgos del Puerto de Manta, sien-
do el acápite final del desarrollo de la metodología propues-
ta, además de que presenta un panorama claro y real de la 
evaluación de riesgos que permite determinar los niveles de 
seguridad; asimismo, desarrolla una metodología que pue-
de ser implementada en cualquier puerto del mundo. 
Palabras claves— Puertos, Seguridad, Riesgos, Medida 
de Protección, Vulnerabilidad, PBIP, SOLAS
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I. IntroductIon
Protection is an essential component in the econo-
mic feasibility for the sea transport system and in-
ternational competitiveness [1]. It also should con-
tribute towards the prevention of crime, terrorism, 
and other types of threats, like illicit trafficking of 
drugs, weapons, people, and other forms of organi-
zed crime, as well as other criminal offences that 
affect freight security and marine transportation 
(armed robbery, stowaways, contraband, among 
others) that constitute a hazard to trade, port acti-
vities, and shipping services [2].
Globally, terrorism is perceived as a permanent 
risk marked with constant occurrence likelihood of 
hostile actions; in this way, the International Ship 
and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) code adopted in 
the SOLAS Convention (December, 2002 in Lon-
don) promotes this course of action [3], [4].
 Facing the new international scenario, the 
General Administration of Ports in Equator es-
tablished a specific area within every Port Autho-
rity to assume the responsibilities that derived 
in the new internationally agreed regulation in 
regard to security. The Department of Port Se-
curity was created especially for the operative 
implementation and application of the different 
international norms about security, counterterro-
rism, and environmental control, the ISPS code, 
for example [5].
Qualified personnel and the promotion of techno-
logy development are required for preventive con-
trol in the port jurisdiction, backing Manta’s Port 
Authority decision on creating an administration 
specialized in comprehensive security matters.
Certainly, port security may arise as a relevant 
topic in international trading negotiations and 
government’s orientations about the maritime field 
should be coordinated so as to ease the application 
of effective solutions.
Port authorities need to create the means to 
exchange updated information on port security 
matters and to disseminate prevention measures 
within the commercial sector [6].
The problem posed is treated with a research 
strategy that, with rigor, fulfills certain methodo-
logical parameters, this is, quantitative and qua-
litative methods but with a hybrid process (which, 
from diverse perspectives, is always beneficial). A 
methodological triangulation is always the result 
of blending and joining qualitative and quantitati-
ve strategies [7], as it will be explained in section 
III.
II. LIterary revIew
Since 9/11, a massive increase in personal, com-
mercial, and governmental expenses in favor of 
counterterrorism strategies has been observed, 
just as the proliferation of programs for fighting 
terrorism [8], [9]. In 2002, the budget destined 
for counterterrorism and critical infrastructure 
protection was doubled [10] and, after issuing the 
HSPD 7 (Homeland Security Presidential Directi-
ve 7) in December 2003, which establishes a natio-
nal policy for Federal Agencies and Departments 
whose aim is identifying, prioritizing, and protec-
ting critical infrastructure, it was sixfold by 2004 
[11].
However, this estimation does not represent 
the total amount of defense investment in the 
United States. Large quantities have been direc-
ted for the creation of government agencies like 
the Deparment of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
restructuring of the Department of Defense with 
the conformation of the Northern Command (Nor-
thcom which is in charge of the territory defense 
of countries like the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and 
part of the Caribbean), and the reordering of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [12]; also 
for improving airport and border security, incre-
asing research on response to biological or chemi-
cal agents, creating new laws, improving medical 
response for emergencies, providing help to other 
countries [13], and creating programs to reduce te-
rrorism by strengthening potential objectives (e.g. 
reinforcing airport security control, placing barri-
cades around buildings, or improving security for 
diplomats [14]).
Likewise, the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA) was enacted, in which the 
Transportation Security Administration was 
created for, as its name states, regulating public 
transportation in the United States [15]. It would 
also be responsible for the purchase, installation, 
and enhancement of monitoring equipment [16]; 
training security personnel; developing access 
protocols to control ramps, storage area, airplane 
parking spaces, and other restricted areas and fa-
cilities in cooperation with security managers in 
airports [17].
Specially, after 2004 Madrid train bombings, 
the European Commission (EC) wanted to impro-
ve security in different infrastructure types of the 
European Union considered as “critical”, for this, a 
program with a course of action was put forward, 
including the creation of norms in order to support 
Member States identify them [18].
In 2004, the European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) was created 
to help enterprises and public administrations of 
Member States complement and coordinate efforts 
in topics related to security and critical infrastruc-
ture identification, vulnerability, and interdepen-
dence, as well as for protection solutions and event 
preparation [19]. A national coordination body for 
CIP was created as the only supervision body of 
the EPCIP in the Member States [20].
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There is also a large amount of literature avai-
lable regarding risk analysis and security in 
maritime ports [21], as well as very specific and 
controlled protocols about this topic. Among the 
international regulations and treaties for security 
certifications are:
The Safety of Life at Sea or SOLAS treaty, the 
most important of all the international treaties 
about ship security. Its first version was approved 
in 1914 as a response to the Titanic catastrophe 
[22]. New versions have been adopted in 1929, 
1948, 1960, and 1974, still in force. The treaty is 
subject of permanent amendments, whether by re-
solutions approved in the Maritime Safety Commit-
tee (MSC) meetings or by the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO) [23]. The main objective 
is to stipulate ship’s construction, equipment, and 
usage norms so as to guarantee its safety and that 
of the people onboard. 
 The ISPS code is a new chapter within the 
SOLAS treaty that describes special measures to 
improve maritime security, explicitly, against te-
rrorist or illegal actions; hence, it demands from 
ships, marine transportation companies, and port 
facilities the achievement of all the prescriptions 
established in the aforementioned code [24]. 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a 
program implemented by the United States in 
January 2002 that represents an attempt of the 
Customs and Border Protection to substantially 
improve the detection of weapons of mass destruc-
tion transported by sea. It includes the presence 
of U.S. customs officers in foreign ports to identi-
fy and examine high risk containers, even before 
departing from their origin ports abroad, in order 
to prevent them from entering U.S. territory. Any 
suspicious container will be scanned and even un-
loaded by local port authorities before departing to 
the U.S. [25, 26]
The Megaports Initiative (2003) is a U.S. attempt 
for protecting the offshore grid from any hazardous 
cargo and nuclear materials. The aim is to scan, as 
much as possible, container trafficking regardless 
of their destinations and causing the least impact 
in port operations [27]. 
 Other U.S. initiatives are the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) whose ob-
jective is to extend as far as possible security peri-
meters to guarantee that importers transport their 
goods in secure associations since the moment the 
merchandise leaves the factory until the moment 
in which the retailer receives it [2, 28].
The Business Alliance for Secure Commerce 
(BASC) program, just as the Framework of stan-
dards to secure and facilitate global trade, aims at 
establishing global security standards and proce-
dures to be implemented within the logistics chain 
of global trade. The implementation of this measu-
re is not mandatory [29], [30] y [31].
The BTA or BioTerrorism Act, also known as the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Prepa-
redness and Response Act (PHSBPRA), is a norm 
based on the substantial amendments created by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statutes. 
This Act considers preventive criteria to counter 
bioterrorism actions by increasing control of food 
and biological elements flow [32].
The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) is a 
program fostered by the World Customs Organi-
zation (WCO) that improves supply chain security, 
and also reduces cargo malicious handling and ac-
cident risks [33]; and the 24-hour rule, which for-
ces maritime transporters to send detailed infor-
mation of shipments 24 hours before stowing cargo 
for the U.S. [34]. 
 U.S. initiatives will probably become global; 
however, they will translate into significant costs 
for ports of developing countries, for this reason, it 
is strongly recommended to be careful in its imple-
mentation.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)’s report on Container Se-
curity of February 2004, already warned about the 
higher costs and responsibilities these initiatives 
implied for these countries and the consequences 
these issues, besides port competition, might bring 
to small maritime terminals survival.
Within the most well-known security methods, 
the operational modality is evidenced in order to 
determine whether it is compatible with the set of 
security measures or not; in this way, in a public 
port, where free access for operation and stevedo-
ring companies is the rule, is not suitable for the 
implementation of CSI, CTPAT, or BASC, since 
personnel control of multiple service providers 
cannot be ensured in the same manner as with an 
integral operator of a port terminal [35].
For a port terminal to be qualified for CSI, CT-
PAT, or BASC implementation, besides assuring 
operational management being provided by just 
one operator, it is also necessary exclusive access 
to the terminal and effective access control of vehi-
cles, people, and merchandise, as well as its securi-
ty management faculty [36].
In Equator’s case, private entities that certify 
port facilities are
• Business Alliance for Secure Commerce - BASC
• Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism- 
CTPAT
In the next section, a practical method for a 
worldwide application parallel to those established 
by the ISPS-BASC and ISPS-CTPAT will be su-
ggested. This method is a user-friendly quantitati-
ve and qualitative valuation for each port to be im-
plemented. For this case, the Department of Port 
Security of Manta can obtain its risk matrix so as 
to identify future and potential risks for every as-
set in the port.
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III. MethodoLogy
With the objective of developing an assessment 
methodology for the security in Manta’s port, secon-
dary objectives are achieved progressively in order 
to create a risk matrix, this means, a Port vs Secu-
rity study [37].
The method applied for this study allows addres-
sing port infrastructure security through clear gui-
delines and generating as result a risk matrix that 
includes aspects such as facilities and existing ser-
vices; hazards like car bomb threats, illegal drug 
trade, stowaways, and ship hijacking; and the safe-
guarding equipment installed and detected vulne-
rabilities [38].
The stages for this method are summarized in 
Fig. 1:
Previous study of infrastructure      
Threat identification  
Assets to protect 
Weaknesses
Existing protection measures 
Fig. 1. Methodological Process to Achieve 
the Risk Matrix of the Port of Manta.
Source: Author
A. Previous Study of Infrastructure 
First, a previous study of port infrastructures 
around the world needs to be performed so as to con-
centrate in the particular case later, this is, a top-
down approach, from the general to the particular. 
According to the method proposed, transportation 
operation in the Port of manta is analyzed taking 
into account all its singularities as fishing, commer-
cial, and passenger port [39].
Ports are comprised of different terminals, which 
in turn, are conformed of several subsystems, thus, 
complicating all the processes in the port. For this 
reason, a previous study of port facilities is requi-
red, which will be needed to determine the risk ma-
trix or security matrix [40].
B. Threat Identification
Based on the history of attacks to ports and other 
transportation infrastructures, attacks most likely 
to happen against port infrastructure are identified, 
as well as the techniques and protocols to follow in 
such case.
C. Assets to protect
With public security and the strategic location in 
mind, a detailed analysis of the sea port is carried 
through with the aim of recognizing and classifying 
all the assets to protect.
All risks, vulnerabilities, and most importantly, 
the potential consequences need to be studied again 
in order to pose new methods, solutions, and safe-
guards against threats of high social impact [41].
D. Weaknesses
As of a detailed study, port infrastructure weaknes-
ses are recognized, for instance, design, technology, 
operation, and management elements of assets that 
can increment the probability of a threat really hap-
pening. In the case of transportation infrastructure, 
passenger services prevail over secondary services 
offered in situ or in the vicinity [42]. It is impor-
tant to remember that weaknesses, more if evident, 
may encourage threats to occur. Anyway, in all this 
chain, humans will still be the weakest link.
E. Existing Protection Measures
Closely related to weaknesses is the identification of 
existing protection measures. These can be attained 
from the infrastructure study during a field visit in 
which installed measures to date are collected, num-
bered, and described in detail [43].
A critical infrastructure may exhibit vulnerabili-
ties regarding physical and sensible threats and not 
be able to consider safeguards of each type in separa-
te plans. Likewise, all the safeguards must be inte-
grated into a master plan because, currently, critical 
infrastructure operators have to follow many securi-
ty plans: sectoral strategies, comprehensive security, 
safety of the operator, specific protection, emergency, 
business continuity, self-protection, industrial safety, 
etc. [44].
As multidisciplinary project, challenge-oriented 
policies and regulations are to be posed towards the 
demands of each milieu, differentiating the necessi-
ties of the government, the industry, and the users 
[45],[46].
F. Risk and Consequence Analysis 
Currently, as stated before, critical infrastructure 
operators, like sea ports, have to follow many secu-
rity plans, hence, security convergence is strongly 
recommended [47].
The next step is estimating attack occurren-
ce probability and its impact provided it actua-
lly happened. For this, a hazard analysis for the 
infrastructure’s most relevant assets is performed 
together with a quantitative valuation of a given 
13
Inge CuC, vol. 11 no. 2, pp 9-17, July - December, 2015
threat’s risk and its possible aftermaths [48]. First, 
the likelihood of occurrence of a threat event is as-
signed, and afterwards, the impact it could have is 
also defined. In this way, the risk level will be map-
ped for every asset in regard to the threats consi-
dered.
To determine the likelihood of a hazardous event, 
a qualitative estimation is carried through using a 
scale which goes from highly unlikely to very likely, 
as seen in Fig. 2. Likewise, the impact produce in 
case of a real event can also be classified; this varies 
in a scale from low to very high.
HIGHLY 
UNLIKELY
VERY 
LIKELY
Hazard Likelihood
of Occurrence 
Impact
Likelihood
Very  high
High
Medium
Low
Fig. 2. Likelihood of Occurrence: Hazard and Impact. 
Source: Author
Table I illustrates the result of crossing the im-
pact and hazard likelihood values (impact * hazard 
likelihood); in Table IV, the assignation of number 
values for each situation is shown.
Table I. IMpact vs hazard LIkeLIhood
IM
PA
CT
HAZARD LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE
Highly Unlikely Very Likely
Very High
Low
Source: Author
Finally, risk level classification is explained in 
Fig. 3. These levels are provided according to the 
valuation obtained in Table I and will belong to one 
category of this scale; it varies from low values, con-
sidered as Risk 4 (Low), to high values, classified as 
Risk 1 (High).
Risk 4
*LOW
Risk 3 
*MEDIUM
Risk 2
*SERIOUS
Risk 1
*HIGH
Fig. 3. Risk Levels.
Source: Author
This last valuation of risk levels can be associated 
to colors so as to facilitate risk matrix interpreta-
tion, thus, Risk 1 will be colored as red, Risk 2 as 
orange, Risk 3 as yellow, and Risk 4 as blue. This is 
a very fast and intuitive manner of indicating risk 
levels in the scenarios analyzed. 
G. Risk Matrix
Ultimately, the process of port security planning 
should allow elaborating and implementing measu-
res for port vulnerability reduction [49]. If this pos-
sibility is not recognized, countermeasures cannot 
be elaborated. Port security administration should 
be in conditions to determine the nature and magni-
tude of any hazardous event affecting the security of 
the operations [50]. As a consequence, the first task 
in the process of a security regime establishment in 
ports is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of secu-
rity conditions [6].
With the data gathered in the previous stages, 
a risk matrix is elaborated for the Port of Manta. 
In this matrix, assets, along with the likelihood of 
occurrence of any hazard and the damages caused, 
provided the event actually happens, are displayed.
The final result will show the risk level associa-
ted to its corresponding color, in this manner, the 
analysis passes from an approximate qualitative es-
timation to a final quantitative valuation, which is 
more objective. Hence, port infrastructure elements 
are already classified with the risks each one poses.
Iv. resuLts and dIscussIon
Once the methodology has been explained, results 
from the development of the method suggested are 
gathered in this section. In the next paragraphs, 
these results are described in detailed.
A. Previous Study of Infrastructure 
A previous study of the infrastructure in the Port 
of Manta has been accomplished during the techni-
cal visit in 2014. It was used to determine the risk 
matrix.
As it was observed, the infrastructure of the Port 
of Manta is in optimum conditions after receiving a 
state contribution to rebuild the International Dock 
1 and the Fishing Dock, replace the old pilings, and 
repair slabs from the berth line [51].
B. Threat Identification 
From the threat identification through history inci-
dents, it was concluded that threats against the port 
systems can be summarized in Table II, where the 
kind of hazard is also presented. The last hazardous 
events in the Port of Manta can be comprised in four 
large groups.
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Table II. port systeM threats 
Main Threats in the Port System
Car bomb Illegal drug trade Stowaways Ship hijack
Source: Author
C. Assets to Protect
Regarding public security and strategic location, a 
detailed study of the sea port is performed in order to 
recognize and classify all the assets to be protected, 
as shown in Fig. 4.
People
Facilities 
Software services
Electric power services
Vicinity facilities
Fig. 4. Assets to Protect in the Port of Manta.
Source: Author
The approach to asset analysis can be performed 
in different ways. In the case of a sea port is easier 
to consider separately merchandise subsystems of so-
lids, liquid, common goods, passenger terminal, etc., 
and subsequently, study each one of these typologies.
D. Weaknesses
As a consequence of the threat typification present 
in the Port of Manta, in this section all port infras-
tructure shortcomings are identified; this is, design, 
technology, operational, and management elements 
of assets likely to be hazard targets are recognized.
Once again, weaknesses, more when evident, can 
encourage threats to become real attacks.
The flaws detected in the Port of Manta revolve 
around IT systems used to identify abnormalities in 
the performance of port activities
E. Existing Protection Measures
Quite related to weaknesses is the identification of 
existing protection procedures. All measures aimed 
at detecting and/or decreasing threats are listed (e.g. 
access control, restricted areas, barriers, CCTV, etc.) 
and every port facility undergoes a checking proce-
dure (Table III). 
Table III. exIstIng protectIon 
Measures In the port of Manta 
List of Security Measures Port of Manta – Equator
Access control barriers (Closing systems) 3 barriers
Entrance systems (barriers, huts) 2 people
People identification sytems Yes
Peopleand vehicle search and tracking Yes
CCTV (Closed Circuit TV) Yes
Intruder detection Yes
Fire and smoke detectors Yes
Emergency and first aid equipment Yes
Back-up systems Yes
Communication systems Yes
Personnel training Yes
Emergency and evacuation procedures Yes
Colaboration agreements Yes
Security plan Yes
Contingency plan Yes
Dogs and patrols Yes
Security guards Yes
Source: Author
Exisitng protection measures in the Port of Manta 
are listed above. And to continue with the method’s 
application, the next section analyzes risks and con-
sequences, provided hazards or attacks become real 
in the port facilities [52].
F. Risk and Aftermath Analysis
The result of the suggested method applied and 
described in prior sections is a table that estimates 
threat or attack likelihood and their impact. Results 
are both quantitative (valuation with numbers of 
hazard threats) and qualitative (risk allocation by 
colors).
Table IV allocates, first, the likelihood of occu-
rrence of hazard threats, and second, the subse-
quent impact; in this way, risk levels are mapped for 
every asset before all threats. 
Likelihood of occurrence was estimated in a qua-
litative manner with a scale ranging from highly 
unlikely to very likely. Likewise, to classify impact 
levels, a scale ranging from low to very high was 
adopted.
As final step, Table IV crosses impact and like-
lihood values and numeric values were allotted 
according to each situation. And finally, risk level 
classification is also presented: the lowest values, 
considered as Risk 4 (low), are green; and the hig-
hest values, Risk 1 (very high), are red. Interme-
diate values are also differentiated with yellow and 
orange.
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Table Iv. IMpact vs LIkeLIhood of 
occurrence In the port of Manta
Impact – 
severity 
levels
Likelihood of occurrence
(5) 
Very 
Likely
(4) 
Likely
(3) 
Sporadic
(2) 
Unlikely
(1) 
Very 
Unlikely
IV (Very 
High) 20 16 12 8 4
III 15 12 9 6 3
II 10 8 6 4 2
I (None) 5 4 3 2 1
Source: Author
G. Risk Matrix
In the application of this method, a risk matrix for 
the Port of Manta was elaborated as final outcome. 
The matrix sets forth the assets to be protected and 
the likelihood of hazard occurrence, also, the corres-
ponding damage for the worst scenario: an attack 
event.
Table V poses risk levels associated to the corres-
ponding color, as explained above. Hence, a more 
objective perspective with a qualitative and quanti-
tative valuation can be observed. Every port infras-
tructure element was classified with the risks they 
present individually.
Table V. rIsk MatrIx for the port of Manta
PORT OF MANTA Car bomb Illegal drug trade Stowaways
Ship 
hijacking
ASSETS THREAT
People
Staff of Manta’s Port Authority 3/IV 3/III 2/III
Cruise tourists 3/III 4/IV
Merchant marine staff 1/III 2/III 3/III 4/IV
Fishermen 2/IV 4/IV 5/III
Longshoremen 2/IV 1/IV 1/II 2/III
Maritime Area
Mouth of the port 1/III 3/III 2/III 4/IV
Water mirror 5/III 3/IV 4/IV
Beaches 2/III 3/III 5/IV
Buoys and navigation aids 2/III 1/III
Port Facilities
Inland port infrastructures 2/III 4/IV 3/III
Docks 2/III 4/III 2/III 4/IV
Marine station 4/IV 4/IV 4/IV
Lighthouses 2/IV 1/II 2/III
Sea walls 3/III 4/III 3/III 4/III
Yacht club 4/IV 3/III 1/III 4/III
Truck parking lots 4/III 2/III 1/IV
Cranes and handling equipment 2/III 1/III 1/III
Maritime service stations (gas) 2/IV 2/III 4/III
Other Important Facilities
Airport 4/III 3/IV 1/I
Petroecuador- Hydrocarbons 4/IV 2/II
Electrical power station 4/IV 2/II
Software, Phones, and 
Power Lines 
Database system and pone facilities 3/IV 3/III 3/II
Electrical installations 3/IV 1/I 1/I
Ships
Fishing ships 4/IV 3/III 4/IV
Passenger merchant vessels 2/IV 2/III 2/IV 4/IV
Goods merchant vessels 2/IV 4/IV 3/IV 4/IV
Source: Author
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The risk matrix was elaborated using bench-
marking information and the data provided by the 
port authority of Manta during the in situ visit. Re-
search criteria were added to estimate quantitative 
and qualitative valuations of risk levels for each as-
set under the circumstances previously mentioned.
v. concLusIons
The Risk Matrix of the Port of Manta was elabora-
ted, it being the final stage of the method suggested 
in this paper. This matrix sets forth a clear and real 
perspective for risk assessment so as to determine 
security levels.
When analyzing the Risk Matrix of the Port of 
Manta, it is evidenced that the most exposed assets 
to hazard events are: People, fishermen; Maritime 
area, mirror of water; Port facilities, fishing ships 
and vessels; and the most probable hazards are 
ship hijacking and illegal drug trade. Thus, the port 
authority of Manta needs to concentrate efforts in 
them and create protection measures.
The information provided in this paper constitu-
tes one of the most relevant contributions for the 
development of a method that can be implemented 
in any port of the world. It provides a user-friendly, 
quantitative-qualitative approach that allowed 
creating a risk matrix for every scenario, revealing 
existing critical assets and their valuation regar-
ding the risks considered. Additionally, it can en-
hance the design and implementation of a compre-
hensive port planning method. 
To conclude, the general objective of developing a 
risk assessment method that identifies security le-
vels and systems to be improved was accomplished; 
in this way, it can be proved that this method is use-
ful to, ultimately, provide more security to the Port 
of Manta and solve the problem posed in this paper. 
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